There is a growing resurgence in the study of psychedelic medicines for the treatment of mental health and substance use disorders. However, certain early investigations are marred by questionable research methods, abuses against research participants, and covert Central Intelligence Agency financial involvement. The purpose of this study was to understand how and to what extent people of colour and other vulnerable populations, specifically, individuals who were incarcerated or incapacitated due to mental health issues, were exploited during the first wave of (...) psychedelic research in the USA. To do so, we reviewed available empirical publications according to current ethical standards. Variables of interest included race and ethnicity of participants, population vulnerability, drug administration conditions, informed consent and undue influence. Our findings draw attention to the history of research abuses against people of colour in Western psychedelic research. In light of these findings, we urge a call-to-action to current psychedelic researchers to prioritise culturally inclusive and socially responsible research methods in current and future studies. All data relevant to the study are included in the article. (shrink)

The moral standing of involuntary sterilization has long been subject to debate but has only recently been looked upon with disfavor. When sterilization of a mentally handicapped minor is entertained, issues of eugenics, medical ethics, and legal precedent specially arise. Ethics consultants and ethics committees have been asked to consider such cases.

As mechanical restraints have never been proven effective in clinical practice, they should not be used routinely. They should be considered a non‐validated therapy requiring consent.

The utilitarian economist and Nobel Laureate John Harsanyi and the liberal egalitarian philosopher John Rawls were two of the most eminent scholars writing on problems of social justice in the last century. This volume pays tribute to Harsanyi and Rawls by investigating themes that figure prominently in their work. In some cases, the contributors explore issues considered by Harsanyi and Rawls in more depth and from novel perspectives. In others, the contributors use the work of Harsanyi and Rawls (...) as points of departure for pursuing the construction of theories for the evaluation of social justice. The introductory essay by the editors provides background information on the relevant economics, game theory, philosophy, and social choice theory, as well as readers' guides to the individual contributions, to make this volume widely accessible to scholars in a wide range of disciplines. (shrink)

John Martin Fischer’s charge that Molinism does not offer a unique answer to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom can be seen as a criticism of middle knowledge for begging the question of FF -compatibilism. In this paper, I seek to answer this criticism in two ways. First, I demonstrate that most of the chief arguments against middle knowledge are guilty of begging the question of FF-incompatibilism and conclude that the simple charge of begging the question cannot (...) be as problematic as some suggest. Determinists and open theists incorporate FF-incompatibilist notions into their respective versions of the grounding objection, their conceptions of risk and libertarian freedom, and their requirements for divine foreknowledge. Thus, while I admit that Molinism does rely upon Ockhamist and Augustinian principles in its approach to the dilemma and is guilty of presupposing FF-compatibilism, I deny that this undermines its strength as a model of providence. Second, I argue that, although all models are guilty of question-begging moves, they are not all on par with one another. Molinism offers a more orthodox and robust approach to providence than open theism and process theology, and it handles empirical data better than all of its competitors. (shrink)

Michel Hue et Olivier Pelon, La salle à piliers du palais de Malia et ses antécédents. P, 1-36 La salle à piliers ou «salle hypostyle» du palais de Malia présente une architecture que l'on a parfois rapprochée de prototypes égyptiens. Dans le cadre des recherches menées depuis 1964 sur l'architecture et la chronologie du palais, cette salle a été réétudiée en 1990. La fouille a révélé la présence dans une couche de destruction MR IA de fragments (...) de stucs peints à motifs, un fait exceptionnel au palais. Manifestement venue de l'étage, cette fresque confirme l'analyse de J. W. Graham qui voyait dans la salle de l'étage une salle d'apparat, probablement une salle de banquets. Par ailleurs une série de bases trouvées sous le niveau du sol dans l'alignement des piliers de la salle actuelle établit que, dès l'époque protopalatiale (MM IA-MM II), le schéma de la salle à piliers existait déjà sur le même emplacement. Les origines de cette architecture sont donc à rechercher en Crète même bien plutôt qu'à l'extérieur. (shrink)

Ruy Perez Tamayo, Rubén Lisker, and Ricardo Tapia, La Construcción de la Bioética, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2007, reviewed by Arleen L. F. Salles.

Les recherches menées en 1992 à l'intérieur et aux alentours immédiats de la salle IX 2 se situaient dans le prolongement de celles de 1990 qui avaient permis de détecter l'existence, au-dessous et au pied des piliers de cette salle dite «hypostyle», d'une série de bases de poteaux qui faisaient remonter le plan de la salle à supports multiples à l'époque protopala- tiale. Leurs résultats confirment la succession stratigraphique, au Nord de la cour centrale du palais, d'un (...) important bâtiment prépalatial (MA IIB) dont l'orientation est déjà celle du palais postérieur et de deux phases palatiales (MA III-MM II et MM III-MR I) d'un même dispositif architectural de salle à supports multiples. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es, por una parte, ofrecer una nueva interpretación de la teoría estoica de los universales a la luz del debate entre nominalismo, conceptualismo y realismo, y, por otra, desentrañar un paralelismo entre el análisis propuesto por los estoicos de enunciados cuyo sujeto gramatical son términos genéricos, y el análisis propuesto por Russell de enunciados como "El actual rey de Francia es calvo". Al final del trabajo se estudian las bases metafísicas de la teoría estoica de (...) los universales y se señala una posible tensión en su interior. The aim of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the Stoic theory of universals in the light of the debate between nominalism, conceptualism and realism, and to bring out a parallel between the analysis proposed by the Stoic Chrysippus of statements whose grammatical subject is a generic term, and the analysis developed by Russell of statements such as "The current King of France is bald". At the end of the paper, the metaphysical basis of the Stoic theory of universals is examined and a possible contradiction in it is brought out. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications for medical decision-making of the communitarian view. The launching point is a sketch and clarification of the communitarian view which I characterize in terms of its fundamental commitment to the relational self. This commitment poses a challenge to much traditional work in bioethics for it asks us to start focusing not on rights and individualistic conceptions of interests and autonomy but on those values needed to sustain communities. I attempt to show that while some of (...) the communitarian objections to conventional bioethical approaches have brought to the fore aspects of moral experience that must be taken seriously, the communitarian vision does not succeed in discrediting bioethics “patient-centeredness” rightly understood. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RECLAIMING LIBERALISM * DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN St. John's University Jamaica, New York Through the shift of emphasis from natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the moral world, since man-as distinguished from man's end-had become that center or origin. -Leo Strauss T:HE CONCEPTION of individuality that lies at the oundation of natural rights classical liberalism has been (...) a arget of criticism for some time. This is not news. What is news and what is becoming more apparent to those who examine the issue is that the alternatives Strauss presents in the above quotation are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, as I and my colleague, Douglas J. Den Uyl, have recently observed: Making the individual the moral center of the universe does not require that one accept nominalism, mechanism, or hedonism, nor does accepting essentialism, teleology, and eudaimonism... require rejecting individualism. It is possible for the fulfillment of the individual to be interpreted in terms of the requirements for human wellbeing. There can be a view of the ego or self that is neither otherwordly nor Hobbesian, but Aristotelian. Further, the achievement of man's natural end need not be interpreted along Platonic lines. There is no such thing as the flourishing of "man." There is only the flourishing of individual men. The human good neither exists apart from the chokes and actions of individual human beings nor independent of the particular " mix " of goods that the individual human being must determine as appropriate for his circumstances. *This essay is based on a paper presented at a meeting of the American Association for the Philosophic Study of Society, American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) convention, December 29, 1991 in New York City. This meeting was devoted to David L. Norton's book Democracy and Moral Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 109 110 DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN Strauss's dichotomy betrays a disturbing tendency, often found among proponents of natural right and natural law, to reify the concept " natural end " and make it some good that competes with the good of individual human beings.1 David L. Norton in his recent work, Democracy and Moral Development, has also noted the nonexclusivity of Strauss's alternatives. Conditioned as we are by modernity's conception of the individual, the question of replacing avarice as the thematic motivation in lives of persons is likely to leave us at a loss. What else could possibly serve? The purpose of this book is to propose the eudaimonistic answer, and that answer is love in the meaning of Eros. Thus understood, love is not exclusively or primarily interpersonal; it is first of all the right relationship of each person with himself or herself. The self to which love is in the first instance directed is the ideal self that is aspired to and by which random change is transformed into the directed development we term growth. When the ideal of the individual is rightly chosen, it realizes objective values that subsisted within the individual as innate potentialities, thereby achieving in the individual the self-identity that is termed "integrity" and that constitutes the foundation of other virtues.2 Norton desires to reconceptualize the individualism historically associated with classical liberalism so as both to retain the gains of classical liberalism and to overcome its moral minimalism. According to Norton, the crucial problem with the conception of individuality historically associated with classical liberalism is that it is "non-developmental," or rather, there is only development within a single stage, namely, for self-preservation. There is nothing more. There is no standard of self-perfection by which to distinguish satisfaction of desire from satisfaction of right desire -no way to distinguish Socrates's satisfaction from that of a fool's. Norton thus seeks to replace classical liberalism's non-developmental conception of individuality with a eudaimonistic conception of the individual. 1 Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uy!, Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991), pp. 2 Democracy and Moral Development, p. 40. 92-93. RECLAIMING LIBERALISM 111 By replacing classical liberalism's conception of individuality with a... (shrink)

Cet article est consacré aux emplois dits « génériques » des pronoms de deuxième personne _tu_ et _vous_, emplois dans lesquels ils peuvent concurrencer certains emplois indéfinis du pronom _on. _Selon certaines analyses, en particulier celles qui font valoir une restructuration du système pronominal français, _tu_ et _vous_ apparaissent comme de simples équivalents de _on_. Selon d’autres analyses, au contraire, le choix de _tu_ ou _vous_ à la place de _on_ n’est pas arbitraire et _tu_ et _vous_ génériques conservent une (...) valeur d’interpellation de l’interlocuteur ou de l’interlocutrice. Nous tenterons de montrer que _tu_ et _vous_ génériques, bien qu’ils ne correspondent pas nécessairement au pronom d’adresse utilisé (notamment _tu_ générique, qui peut être utilisé en contexte de vouvoiement) et qu’ils puissent être indifférents au statut de l’interlocuteur ou de l’interlocutrice (genre ou nombre de celui-/celle-ci, ceux-/celles-ci), conservent bien une valeur d’adresse. (shrink)

En este trabajo discuto el argumento de Crisipo a favor de la indestructibilidad del cosmos que aparece en Eusebio, Praeparatio Evangelica 15.18.1-3. Este argumento complementa al que aparece en Plutarco, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis1052C, pero descansa sobre una base distinta, a saber, la teoría de la disolución de los cuerpos complejos en los cuatro elementos y la teoría sobre cómo estos últimos se transforman los unos en los otros. Según veremos, existen antecedentes importantes de estas teorías en Anaxímenes y su teoría (...) del cambio. Al final, me ocupo de dos objeciones que los propios estoicos formularon en contra del argumento de Crisipo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Solitude: A Philosophical EncounterRobert D. CottrellSolitude: A Philosophical Encounter, by Philip Koch; xiv & 375 pp. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1994, $39.95 cloth, $17.95 paper.A professor of philosophy at the University of Prince Edward Island (an attractively solitary spot, I should imagine), Philip Koch divides his book into two parts, asking in Part I: what is solitude? and in Part II: what role does solitude play (...) in our lives? At the beginning of his inquiry, Koch identifies two primary modes of human experience: solitude, the core definition of which is social disengagement, and encounter, that is to say, interaction with others. Both are essential for human completion; indeed, the inescapable link between solitude and encounter is illustrated in the book’s full title, which contains both words. Still, in today’s society solitude is probably less understood and appreciated than encounter, for we tend to stress the supposed primacy of relationships and bonds. Calling himself a partisan of solitude, Koch sets out to correct the imbalance he discerns between solitude and encounter by focusing on how solitude (different, he insists, from loneliness, isolation, privacy, or alienation) contributes to our physical, moral, and emotional well-being.Koch is a philosopher; he defines his terms and then, as he moves along, makes subtle distinctions in his original definitions, rendering each term ever more precise and accurate. Conscious of the slippage of meaning that often occurs in language and of the mischief that can be caused by using terms improperly, Koch points out how Tillich (p. 164) and Mijuskovic (p. 173) go astray by gliding confusedly from one term to another, the result being that their arguments drift into muddle. Koch’s own thinking is pellucidly clear. The major part of his book is a discussion of the value of solitude. He identifies five primary virtues linked to solitude: freedom, attunement to self, attunement to nature, reflective perspective, and creativity. After discussing each of the virtues, Koch answers the objections that have been raised throughout the centuries to the claims he has made for the positive tole of solitude in our lives.Ranging over the whole history of human thought, Koch draws on a vast array of writers, including Tao Tze, Plotinus, Seneca, Augustine, Petrarch, Saint Teresa of Avila, Meister Eckhart, Montaigne, Descartes (always a key figure in any discussion of the evolution of Western thought), Goethe, Wordsworth, Hugo, Emerson, Thoreau, Dickinson, Whitman, Proust, Lawrence, Rilke, Sartre, Eiseley, Woolf, and Sarton. A meticulously learned book, Solitude is also a deeply meditative and an intensely personal one. In this, it resembles the work of Montaigne and of Loren Eiseley, where philosophical or (in the case of Eiseley) scientific knowledge is inseparable from imaginative vision; inseparable, too, from the distinctive voice of the author, for Koch, like Montaigne and Eiseley, moves easily from meditation to recollection, recounting moments of joy or sorrow in his own life. Even Koch’s prose bears some resemblance to that of Montaigne or Eiseley for, like theirs, it vibrates with the peculiarly poetic [End Page 155] intensity that a great writer can find in plain, unadorned speech. Indeed, what remains with the reader of this book, beyond the philosophical arguments and the erudite explanations, relegated wisely to the footnotes at the back of the volume where they are available to serious students without intimidating casual readers, is the seductive charm of the author’s voice, the sense of being addressed directly and intimately. To encounter this marvelous book, written in solitude, read in solitude, is to move beyond solitude and to experience, in the strange way that only a good book can provide, intimacy with another mind, another spirit that is engaged—it, too—in the process of encountering other minds, other spirits.Robert D. CottrellOhio State UniversityCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

We specify two problems in syllogistic: the lack of functoriality of predicates (although a thief is a person, a good thief may not be a good person) and the change of grammatical role of the middle term, from subject to predicate, in some syllogisms. The standard semantics, the class interpretation, by-passes these difficulties but, we argue, in a manner that is at odds with logical intuition. We propose a semantics that is category theoretic to handle these difficulties. With this semantics (...) we specify when syllogisms are valid and we set limits to the class interpretation. To perform this task we show how to construct the categorical notion of an entity in a system of kinds. We devote two brief sections to an argument that our approach is very much in the spirit of Aristotle. (shrink)